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Abstract
By using a deck of cards, it is possible to realize a secure multiparty computation. In particular,
since a new shuffling operation, called a random bisection cut, was devised in 2009, many efficient
card-based protocols have been designed. The random bisection cut functions in the following
manner. A sequence of cards is bisected, and the two halves are shuffled. This results in two
possible cases depending on whether the two halves of the card sequence are swapped. As only two
possibilities exist when a random bisection cut is performed, it has been suggested that information
regarding the outcome of the shuffle could sometimes be leaked visually. Thus, in this paper we
propose some methods for securely implementing a random bisection cut without leaking such
information.
1 Introduction
It is known that by using a deck of cards, we can realize secure multiparty computations. For example,
consider a secure AND computation of bits a ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., assume that we only want to
know the value of a ∧ b. By utilizing a black card ♣ and a red card ♥ , we can represent the value of
a bit as follows:
♣ ♥ = 0, ♥ ♣ = 1.
According to this encoding, each of the input bits a and b can be represented using two face-down
cards of different colors:
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
.
A pair of face-down cards (such as in the above example) is called a commitment. That is, the two
cards on the left constitute a commitment to a, and the two cards on the right constitute a commitment
to b. As in this example, the cards we use are either black cards ♣ or red cards ♥ , whose backs are
assumed to be identical ? . As shown in Table 1, many protocols have been designed to perform a
secure AND computation, from among which we introduce the Mizuki–Sone AND protocol [13]. Given
commitments to inputs a and b along with two additional cards ♣ ♥ , the protocol works as follows.
1. A commitment to 0 is placed between the two input commitments:
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
♣ ♥ ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
→ ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
.
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[3] 4 10 RC 6
[17] 2 12 RC 2.5
[21] 2 8 RC 2
[13] 2 6 RBC 1
[1] 2 5 RC,RBC 5
2. The sequence order is then rearranged as follows:







? ? ? ? ? ? .
3. A random bisection cut is applied as follows:[
? ? ?
∣∣∣ ? ? ? ]→ ? ? ? ? ? ? .
A random bisection cut is a shuffling operation that bisects a sequence of cards and swaps the
two halves randomly. Therefore, the shuffle results in two possible cases, depending on whether
the two halves are swapped, each with a probability of 1/2.
4. The sequence order is rearranged as follows:




? ? ? ? ? ? .
5. The two left-most cards are turned over, and we are able to obtain a commitment to a ∧ b as
follows:
♣ ♥ ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a∧b
? ? or ♥ ♣ ? ? ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a∧b
.
Although we omitted an explanation regarding the correctness and secrecy of this protocol, one
can confirm that the protocol outputs a commitment to a ∧ b by using six cards after one execution
of the random bisection cut [13]. (A protocol such as this that outputs commitments is called a
committed-format protocol.)
In practice, humans can perform a random bisection cut by shuffling the two halves after bisecting






































with a probability of 1/2 for each possibility, where the numbers attached to the cards are for the sake
of convenience.
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(a) Bisection of a sequence
of cards
(b) Shuffling of the two
halves
Figure 1: Execution of a random bisection cut
Following the computational model formalized in the studies [7, 11], this random bisection cut can
be described as follows:
(shuffle, {id, (1 4)(2 5)(3 6)}),
where id represents the identity permutation, and an expression, such as (1 4), represents a cyclic
permutation. Therefore, id indicates that the two halves are not swapped, and permutation (1 4)(2 5)(3 6)
indicates that the two halves are swapped.
Historically, random bisection cuts first appeared when a six-card AND protocol was designed in
2009 [13]. Even before this design, some committed-format AND protocols had been designed. These
earlier protocols employed random cut as a shuffling operation, as shown in Table 1. A random cut



































































Therefore, by following the computational model in the studies [7, 11], we can similarly describe the
random cut as
(shuffle, {id, π, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6, π7}) ,
where π = (8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1).
As seen in Table 1, committed-format AND computations have become more efficient by virtue of
the introduction of the random bisection cut in 2009. This introduction also provided the additional
benefit of improving the efficiency of non-committed-format AND computations and committed-format
XOR computations, as detailed in Table 2. In addition, other efficient protocols have been designed
using random bisection cuts [6, 8, 9, 18,19].
As explained earlier, card-based protocols are intended in practice to be executed by humans who
actually desire to perform secure multiparty computations by using a real deck of cards. Hence, when
we execute a card-based protocol, it is expected that all players gather at the same physical location,
and perform operations, such as shuffles, in public, as in the case of ordinary card games [12] 1.
To implement a random cut in such a situation, it is sufficient that each player cuts a sequence of
face-down cards in turn until all players are satisfied with the result. Indeed, in practice, it is relatively
1It should be noted that recent work (e.g., [15, 16] ) considers the use of private actions by players to design efficient
protocols.
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◦ Non-committed-format AND Protocols
[2] 2 5 RC 1
[10] 2 4 RBC 1
◦ Committed-format XOR Protocols
[3] 4 14 RC 6
[14] 2 10 RC 2
[13] 2 4 RBC 1
Figure 2: Each half is placed in an envelope Figure 3: Each half is placed in a box
easy to implement a random cut such that nobody is able to determine the result of the shuffle at all.
We will discuss this further in Section 5.
When players operate a random bisection cut, if they are not familiar with playing cards and have
difficulty in shuffling the two halves such that each half stays together, as in Figure 1(b), then they
may secure each half using paper clips or envelopes [10, 13]. By using these auxiliary tools, we are able
to fix each of the two halves together, as shown in Figure 2. Following this, it suffices to swap the two
bundles of cards randomly. However, the result of the shuffle could be revealed when we execute a
random bisection cut in public because there are only two possibilities, i.e., the two halves of the card
sequence are swapped or not swapped. That is, someone may count how many times the two bundles
are swapped. To avoid such a leak of information, one solution is that each player shuffles the two
bundles behind his/her back or under a table, so that other players cannot see whether the two bundles
are swapped. In this case, it may be preferable to use envelopes or boxes (as illustrated in Figures 2
and 3) rather than paper clips to avoid malicious actions2. Nevertheless, it is desirable for all actions
to be performed in front of all players and/or third parties publicly. Therefore, in Sections 2, 3, and 4,
we present implementations of random bisection cuts, where every action can be performed in public.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some methods for
implementing a random bisection cut by using auxiliary tools. In Section 3, we propose a method to
reduce the execution of a random bisection cut to the execution of random cuts using dummy cards. In
Section 4, we propose another method to implement a random bisection cut without relying on dummy
cards. In Section 5, we discuss secure implementations of the random cut.
An earlier version of this study was presented and appeared as an LNCS (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science) paper [22]. The present paper is its extension and provides a more secure way for performing
the “spinning throw” (which is an implementation of the random bisection cut) and proposes yet
another implementation reducing the random bisection cut to the random cut so that neither dummy
cards nor trials are needed. Sections 2.2 and 4 are devoted to these new results.
2Envelopes or boxes can be also used for implementing other types of shuffling operations ( [4–6,20]).
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(a) Separator and two halves (b) One half is placed on the
separator
(c) The pile consisting of
one half and the separator
is flipped
(d) The other half is placed
on the pile
Figure 4: Setup for spinning throw
2 Executing a Random Bisection Cut Using Auxiliary Tools
In this section, we provide methods for implementing a random bisection cut by using auxiliary tools
that consist of everyday objects.
2.1 Use of a Separator Card and Rubber Band
In this subsection, we present a novel method of performing a random bisection cut by using a separator
card with a rubber band. Both sides of the separator (as shown in the middle of Figure 4(a)) must be
indistinguishable.
The method works as follows. First, a sequence of cards is bisected, with one half placed on the
separator, as shown in Figure 4(b). Second, the pile consisting of one half and the separator is turned
over, as shown in Figure 4(c)3. Third, the other half is placed on the pile, as shown in Figure 4(d), and
these are fixed together by using a rubber band to prevent the cards from scattering. Next, the pile is
thrown in a spinning manner (as illustrated in Figure 5). We call this action a spinning throw. After
the pile is caught, we are completely unsure of which half is on the top. Finally, the rubber band is
removed, and the actions described in Figure 4 are undone in the reverse order from Figures 4(d) to
4(a). In this manner, we can conduct a random bisection cut securely.
2.2 More Secure Implementation by Using a Ball
During execution of the spinning throw shown in Figure 5, the outcome cannot be traced by human
eyesight. For checking the security of this shuffle, we recorded a video4 of a spinning throw and confirmed
that we could not determine the result of the shuffle by watching the video even in slow-motion.
Nevertheless, someone may assume that if we use an enterprise high-speed camera, the result of this
shuffle might possibly be revealed. To address this issue, we considered the use of a curving polystyrene
foam ball, as shown in Figure 6.
The procedure of using the ball device is as follows. After banding the pile by using a rubber band
and a separator, it is placed in one half of a curving ball, as illustrated in Figure 6(a), covered with the
3The separator prevents information regarding the color of cards from being leaked.
4The camera we used was SONY FDR-AX40 and the video was recorded in 4K resolution and 60 fps.
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(a) Hold the pile of cards
(b) Throw the pile like a coin
Figure 5: A spinning throw
other half (Figure 6(b)), and the halves are then taped together (Figure 6(c)) so as not to be separated.
Finally, the ball is thrown in the air in a spinning manner, as illustrated in Figure 7. In this case, the
pile spins inside the ball, and is therefore shuffled out of sight of everyone present. Consequently, a
random bisection cut is implemented perfectly.
3 Execution of a Random Bisection Cut by Using Dummy
Cards
In this section, we propose a method for reducing the execution of a random bisection cut to the
execution of random cuts by using dummy cards.
Hereafter, we assume that we want to apply a random bisection cut to a sequence of 2n cards,
where n ≥ 2: [
? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
n cards




Formally, it cam be defined as
(shuffle, {id, (1 n+1)(2 n+2) · · · (n 2n)}),
following the card-based computational model [7, 11].
As dummy cards, we use cards with backs as ? and faces other than ♣ and ♥ , namely  or
♠ . Specifically, we use 2ds/2e  and 2bs/2c ♠ cards, where s ≥ 2. That is, we have a total of 2s
additional cards.
By using such dummy cards, we are able to implement a random bisection cut as follows.
1. Place dummy cards with their faces down, as follows:
dummy cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? ? · · · ? ? ? · · · ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
n cards
dummy cards︷ ︸︸ ︷




(a) The pile is placed into
one half of the curving ball
(b) Cover the pile with the
other
(c) The ball’s halves are
taped together
Figure 6: Making a ball device to execute a spinning throw securely
(a) Holding the ball (b) Throwing the ball
(c) Catching the ball
Figure 7: The scene of throwing the ball device in the air with a spin
where the dummy cards are arranged as





· · · ?






· · · ?
♠
.
2. Apply a random cut:
〈 ? ? · · · ? ? ? · · · ? ? ? · · · ? ? ? · · · ? 〉 .
3. Turn over the left-most card.
(a) If the face-up card is  , then turn over cards in the forward (the right-hand) direction
until bs/2c ♠ cards appear. Now that the positions of all of the dummy cards have been
determined, all of them can be removed:
 · · · 
bs/2c cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
♠ · · · ♠
n cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? · · · ?
s cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
 · · · ♠
n cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? · · · ?  · · ·  .
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(b) If the face-up card is ♠ , then turn over cards in the backward direction (aside from cyclic
rotations) until ds/2e  cards appear. After determining the positions of all of the dummy
cards, all of them can be removed:
♠ · · · ♠
n cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? · · · ?
s cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
 · · · ♠
n cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
? · · · ?
ds/2e cards︷ ︸︸ ︷
 · · ·  ♠ · · · ♠ .
(c) If the face-up card is ♣ or ♥ , then turn it over again and return to Step 2.
In this manner, after all the dummy cards have been removed, a random bisection cut is completed.5
In Step 3, the probability that either (a) or (b) occurs is s/(n + s). Therefore, we are able to
implement a random bisection cut by using 2s dummy cards after an average of (n+ s)/s executions of
the random cut.
This method of discarding dummy cards was first devised by Crépeau and Kilian [3], when they
proposed some random permutation generating protocols. We adopted their idea in this study.
Regarding the parameter s, a trade-off exists between the number of required cards and the average
number of executions of the random cut. For example, if we want to implement the Mizuki–Sone six-card
AND protocol [13] with an average number of two random cuts, then we require six additional dummy
cards. This requires more cards than Stiglic’s eight-card AND protocol [21] (although the Mizuki–Sone
six-card AND protocol might have the advantage that its correctness is simpler to understand).
4 Utilizing Vertical Asymmetricity of the Backs of Cards
In Section 3, we required additional types of cards to reduce the execution of a random bisection cut to
the execution of random cuts.
In this section, we present another method to implement a random bisection cut without relying on
dummy cards. To this end, we exploited the vertical asymmetricity of the backs of cards ? . As the
back is asymmetric, it can be seen as either ? or ¿ , depending on its position.
4.1 Reduction to a Random Cut
The method of reducing to a random cut is quite simple, described as follows.
1. The first card of each half is rotated 180◦:
¿ ? · · · ? ¿ ? · · · ? .
2. Apply a random cut:
〈 ¿ ? · · · ? ¿ ? · · · ? 〉
→ ? · · · ¿ · · · ? ? · · · ¿ · · · ? .
Then, cyclically shift the sequence with the first card as ¿ :
¿ ? · · · ? ¿ ? · · · ? .
3. Rotate the two of ¿ again:
¿ ? · · · ? ¿ ? · · · ?
→ ? ? · · · ? ? ? · · · ? .
In this manner, by executing one random cut, we are able to implement a random bisection cut
with no dummy card.
For example, the Mizuki–Sone six-card AND protocol [13] can be implemented using one random
cut, as described in the following subsection.
5Note that we need two types of dummy cards (  , ♠ ) to determine their exact positions.
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4.2 Six-Card AND Protocol with a Random Cut
We rewrite the six-card AND protocol [13] by using the method presented in Section 4.1.
1. The two cards of a commitment to a are placed upside down:
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
♣ ♥ ? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
→ ¿ ¿︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
.
2. The order sequence is rearranged as follows:




¿ ? ? ¿ ? ? .
3. A random cut (rather than a random bisection cut) is applied, and then the card(s) is cyclically
shifted so that the first card is ¿ :〈
¿ ? ? ¿ ? ?
〉
→ ¿ ? ? ¿ ? ? .
4. Two of ¿ are turned over:
♣







? ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
a∧b
.
4.3 Application to Pile-Shifting Scrambles
We can extend the method described in Section 4.1 to implement a more general shuffle, called the
pile-shifting scramble. In a pile-shifting scramble, a card sequence of n cards (such that n mod m = 0)
is divided into m piles, and a random cut is applied to the sequence of the piles without changing the
order of the cards inside each plie. Therefore, a random bisection cut is a special case of pile-shifting
scrambles, i.e., it corresponds to m = 2. One can easily have a reduction of a pile-shifting scramble to
a random cut based on the idea that the first card in each pile is marked by placing it upside down.
In our method, we must apply a random cut to cards with asymmetric backs, and hence information
regarding the result of the shuffle could be leaked more easily than with cards that have identical backs.
By considering the aforementioned, we discuss secure implementations of the random cut in the
next section.
5 Secrecy of Implementations of the Random Cut
In Sections 3 and 4, we proposed some methods for reducing the execution of a random bisection cut to
the execution of random cuts. In general, it is believed that a random cut can be securely implemented
by humans. To support this belief, we discuss the secure implementation of a random cut by shuffling
a real deck of cards.
As a random cut consists of a cyclic shuffle, its simple implementation proceeds as in Figure 8:
some cards (or a card) are taken from the top of the pile, and then moved to the bottom of the pile
(this is called a cut). At every cut, we should change the number of cards to be moved. For such an
implementation, some people can trace the move of cards.
Thus, we require an alternative secure implementation of the random cut. The point of strength of
shuffle secureness is the visual observation of the number of cards moved at every cut, and summing up
of all the numbers. Hence, the key is to ensure that it is impossible for people to count the number of
cards moved during every cut.
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Figure 8: Simple execution of a random cut
Figure 9: Execution of a “Hindu cut”; take a random number of cards from the bottom, move them to
the top of the pile, and repeat this.
One concept is to move cards from the bottom to the top of the pile instead of moving them from
the top to the bottom when executing a cut operation. As such, the recognition of the number of cards
that have been moved becomes difficult. Moreover, if the positions of the cards are out of alignment, as
shown in Figure 8, then it is possible to easily recognize the number of cards moved. Therefore, we
should ensure that cards are not out of alignment when we execute cut operations.
Based on this concept, we found that a variation of the so-called Hindu shuffle (shown in Figure 9)
is effective for preventing the cut operation from being revealed (we call this the Hindu cut).
We have experimentally demonstrated the security of this Hindu cut in the previous paper [22]. A
summary of the experience is as follows. We requested 72 participants (who were non-specialists) to
watch a video depicting the execution of the Hindu cut to the sequence of eight cards containing two
non-identical back sides. As a result, 64 participants told us that they had not been able to track the
move of the shuffle. Regarding the remaining 8 participants, to rule out wild guesses, we asked them to
watch four more videos, and consequently, none of them was able to answer correctly for all of the five
video. Refer to [22] for the details.
6 Conclusion
The random bisection cut has played an important role in improving card-based protocols. However,
implementation issues have not been previously discussed. Therefore, in this paper, we proposed
some novel methods for implementing the random bisection cut and demonstrated that it could be
implemented in practice. Users can choose one from our several methods proposed in Sections 2, 3,
and 4, depending on the availability of auxiliary tools and the patterns of backs of available cards.
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